Samuelson machines and the optimal public-private mix by Clark, Simon & Kanbur, Ravi
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Samuelson machines and the optimal public-private mix
Citation for published version:
Clark, S & Kanbur, R 2006, 'Samuelson machines and the optimal public-private mix' Economics Bulletin,
vol. 8, no. 13, pp. 1-11.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Economics Bulletin
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Clark, S., & Kanbur, R. (2006). Samuelson machines and the optimal public-private mix. Economics Bulletin,
8(13), 1-11.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Samuelson machines and the optimal public-private mix 
Simon Clark Ravi Kanbur
University of Edinburgh Cornell University
Abstract
Standard economic analysis assumes the sets of public and private goods to be exogenously
given. Yet societies very often choose the public-private mix, using resources to convert
seemingly private goods into ones with public goods characteristics and vice versa. In
practice, we see a bewilderingly large variety of public-private mixes across societies. This
papers advances an analysis of the choice of the public-private mix in the framework of
voluntary contributions to public goods provision, by envisaging that, starting from a
situation where all goods have private characteristics, some goods can be changed to have
public goods characteristics at a cost (by purchasing a "Samuelson machine"). It
characterizes the jointly optimal choice of the public-private mix and the efficient supply or
not of the public goods in the mix. This characterization generates a number of testable
predictions on the public-private mix, and on the prevalence of free riding
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1. Introduction
In standard public economics, the division between private goods and public goods is
taken as immutable. Following Samuelson (1954), the assumption that some goods have the
technological feature that their consumption is non-rival and non-excludable is part of the
specification of the model. Given this division, the analysis then asks about such matters
as eﬃcient supply and free riding. Yet in the real world such a neat exogenous division is
not observed. Whether the consumption of a good is in fact non-rival and non-excludable is
often a social or historical construct rather than given by technology.
For example, defence expenditure is often cited as a typical example of a public good: to
defend a county, or to deter an attack on it, is to protect all of its inhabitants. But national
defence is a public good because of the artefact of the nation state, one of whose functions
is to maintain the integrity of its territory. Before the re-unification of Germany in 1991 an
attack on West Germany was not an attack on East Germany. Now it is, and the inhabitants
of the former East Germany benefit from defence expenditure by the inhabitants of what
was West Germany, and vice versa. Who benefits from whose defence expenditure, i.e. the
degree of ’publicness’ of defence, depends on the political constitution of the territory. At
the international level, signing defence treaties or setting up organisations such as NATO
whose central principal is that ’an attack on one is an attack on all’ further extends the
benefits of defence expenditure.1 When individuals and countries agree to collective defence
arrangements, they convert a previously private good to one which now has the properties
of non-rivalry and non-excludability.
A second example concerns the dissemination of information and signals.2 Television
programmes, once produced, are in principle available to everyone: there is no need to
produce another programme or to hire additional actors if more people are to view the
programme. But for viewers to watch the programme they must be able to receive the TV
signal. This requires some form of network, such as transmitters that can relay a signal
across long distances, or a cable network. The network acts as a platform, without which
the TV programme is a private good, rather like a private theatre performance. With the
network in place, the marginal cost of including further viewers is minimal. Thus the network
has the potential to transform a private good into a public good. Of course, some forms of
network do allow viewers to be excluded: the cable company can cut oﬀ your signal if you
do not pay. But ’free-to-air’ signals via conventional transmitters do not allow this. What
we observe, then, is that every society that has access to a dissemination technology has the
opportunity to build a platform and to make TV signals a non-rivalrous and non-excludable
public good. Some societies choose to avail themselves of this opportunity; others do not.
Whether the good is private or public is not exogenously given, but socially determined.
More generally, the “public-private mix” varies considerably across societies. By this
we mean that the composition of goods that are supplied through collective action varies
greatly, even allowing for the share of the government in national income. For example,
local services such as garbage collection demonstrate a broad spectrum between collective
and private provision; in some areas it is individualized, in other areas it is a collective
enterprise to which the whole community contributes. In poor village economies, there is a
1For a review of the economics of alliances and transnational institutions, see Sandler and Hartley (2001).
2For an early analysis, see Samuelson (1958).
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wide variation in the degree to which irrigation is individualized or collectivized. Even when
a good is supplied through collective action, the free rider problem is solved to diﬀerent
degrees in diﬀerent situations, leading to yet more variations in observed patterns for the
supply of the same good (Ostrom, 1990).
The general point is that while in some cases technology is destiny, in others societies can
choose whether a good is private or public. In this paper, we develop a framework to analyse
such choices and to delineate the costs and benefits of one form of social organization over
another. This will allow us begin to identify the factors that determine the public-private
mix in the sense intended here, and thus to explain the variations we observe in practice.
To fix ideas, consider the standard model of voluntary contributions to public goods;
for example see Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). In this model, an individual’s ex-
penditure on the private good benefits only that individual, whereas for public goods each
individual’s expenditure benefits all individuals. In the most common formulation, each in-
dividual benefits from the sum of all individuals’ contributions. If there are two individuals
and they both contribute $10, each will enjoy $20 worth of the public good. In other words,
a machine for turning $10 bills into $20 bills! Such “Samuelson machines” clearly convey
a benefit relative to the alternative of autarchy. If goods can be costlessly converted from
private to public, then a society will want all its good to be public, whether or not there
is free riding in the supply of the public good. If it can be done costlessly, it is better to
eliminate free riding than not; but society is better oﬀ in either case. What is important is
that the conversion provides a platform for positive externalities, which are beneficial relative
to autarchy regardless of whether they are ultimately internalized through further collective
action.
In the context of the voluntary contributions to public goods model we thus envisage
three scenarios for a typical good. One is that the good in question is private. The sec-
ond is that the good is public but that the contributions are the Nash equilibrium of a
non-cooperative game. The third scenario is that the good is public but the contributions
maximize joint welfare - the eﬃcient outcome.3 The value of converting from private to
public thus depends on what sort of collective action takes place after conversion.
Suppose now that the arrangements that need to be established to generate positive
externalities are costly: defence treaties need to be agreed on and signed, TV networks have
to be put in place. In other words, Samuelson machines are costly. How much would society
be willing to pay to get one? If it already hadm such machines, how much would it be willing
to pay for one more? The answer depends in part on whether society will be able to enforce
an eﬃcient outcome once the machine is bought. But suppose that achieving eﬃciency is
itself costly: the institutional conditions for monitoring and penalising free riding do not
come free. However, the value of curbing free riding will itself not be independent of the
number of Samuelson machines in play. Our society must then solve two interdependent
problems–whether or not to curb free riding, and how many machines to buy. It is this
joint solution that the paper develops and interprets in the sections to come.
3This three way classification leaves out some interesting institutional environments, for example in which
the outcome is determined via a political process such as by majority rule. Also, because our Samuelson
machines convert pure private goods into pure public goods, we do not consider scenarios involving local
public goods (which are non-excludable but with rivalry across localities), or club goods (which are excludable
and partially rival); see for example Cornes and Sandler (1986) and Sandler and Tschirhart (1997).
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Section 2 presents the basic model: we develop the simplest possible setting in which our
basic points can be made cleanly and tractably. Section 3 considers the value of Samuelson
machines with and without free riding, and the optimal public-private mix in each setting.
Section 4 analyses the joint decision on public-private mix and whether to control free riding.
Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion and interpretation of the key results.
2. Samuelson Machines
Our basic model is essentially the log-linear version of the standard model of private
contributions to public goods (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986). There are n goods in
all, indexed j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let m of these goods be public and n − m goods be private.
Consumption of a public good is non-excludable and non-rival. Denote the set of public
goods by P . There are two individuals, each with identical lump sum income y. All prices
are normalized at unity. Individual i spends xij on good j, so the budget constraint isP
j
xij = y ; i = 1, 2 (1)
Let the consumption of good j by individual i be denoted cij. Then
cij = xij for j /∈ P (2)
cij = c∼ij = cj = xij + x˜ij for j ∈ P (3)
where ∼ i denotes the individual other than i. Individual i has a utility function
Ui =
P
j
αj log cij ; αj > 0 ∀j ;
P
j
αj = 1 (4)
where log denotes the natural logarithm. Using (2) and (3), we have
Ui =
P
j /∈P
αj log cij +
P
j∈P
αj log cj ; i = 1, 2 (5)P
j /∈P
cij +
P
j∈P
cj = y +
P
j∈P
x˜ij ; i = 1, 2. (6)
We start by considering the Nash equilibrium. Individual i maximizes (5) subject to (6).
Using (2) and (3) the first order conditions are
xij = αj
∙
y +
P
k∈P
x˜ik
¸
, j /∈ P (7)
xij + x˜ij = αj
∙
y +
P
k∈P
x˜ik
¸
, j ∈ P (8)
With identical individuals, xij = x˜ij= xj, so (8) can be rewritten as
2xNj = αj
∙
y +
P
k∈P
xNk
¸
, j ∈ P (9)
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where the superscript N denotes the Nash equilibrium outcome. Solving (9) yields:
P
k∈P
xNk =
∙
β
2− β
¸
y, j ∈ P (10)
where β =
P
k∈P αk. Then (2), (3), (7), (8), and (10) give consumption levels:
cNj =αj
∙
2
2− β
¸
y for all j. (11)
Thus utility for each individual in the Nash equilibrium is
V N = K + log y + log
2
(2− β) (12)
where K =
Pn
j=1 αj log αj. V
0 = K+ log y is the utility level that can be achieved if an
individual is unable to take advantage of the other’s provision of public goods.
The eﬃcient allocation is derived as the solution to
max
nP
j=1
αjlogc1j +
nP
j=1
αjlogc2j s.t.
P
j /∈P
(c1j + c2j) +
P
j∈P
cj = 2y (13)
The common consumption levels are thus given by
cEj = αjy j /∈ P (14)
cEj = 2αjy j ∈ P (15)
and the achieved level of utility by
V E = K + log y + β log 2, (16)
where the superscript E denotes the socially eﬃcient outcome.
It can be seen directly from (12) and (16) that utility in both regimes N and E depends
on the set of goods that are public. In particular, given the parameters α1, ..., αn, both
V N and V E increase with β. This is shown in Figure 1, where V 0 is set equal to 0. As
expected, when β = 0 (i.e. when all goods are private), there can be no free riding in the
Nash Equilibrium and V N = V E = V 0. The possibility of free riding arises when β > 0,
and for 0 < β < 1, V 0 < V N < V E. But surprisingly, V N = V E when β = 1. At first,
this seems counter-intuitive; one might expect that the more public goods there are, the
greater the welfare loss from free riding. But free riding operates when agents under-supply
public goods and consume more private goods; in other words, free riding needs a public
good/private good margin at which to operate. If β = 1 this margin does not exist; and
even if β is close to 1, then private goods carry little weight in agents’ utility functions, so
the incentive to free ride is very low. The eﬃciency loss V E −V N thus depends both on the
opportunity for free riding, which requires a high level of β, and the incentive to free ride,
which requires a low level of β. For extreme values of β, one of the requirements is absent.
In our model, it is easily checked that V E − V N is greatest when β = 2 − (log 2)−1. When
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consumers have identical preferences, the result that the eﬃciency loss is zero if there are
only public goods is quite general, since all consumers will choose their private supply of
public goods to maximise the same utility function u(c1, c2, ...cn).
This completes the setting up of the basic model. The next section analyses outcomes
when the set of public goods, P , is itself a choice variable.
3. The Public-Private Mix With and Without Eﬃcient Supply
If this society had a costless choice, it would always opt for increasing β. It does not
matter through what combinations of public goods β is increased - all sets P for which β is
the same are identical from the point of view of social welfare. We therefore focus on β as
the key choice variable, and characterize the cost of public goods technology as the cost of
increasing β. Moreover, for analytical ease we work with the approximation that there are
a large number of goods and treat β as a continuous variable.
Let us suppose that society could “purchase” β at a unit cost (in terms of endowment)
of 2θ, so that the per capita marginal cost of converting a private goods technology into a
public goods technology is θ. Then for a given level of β utility in regimes N and E is
V N = K + log (y − θβ) + log 2
(2− β) (17)
V E = K + log (y − θβ) + β log 2 (18)
As in the previous section V N = V E if β equals zero or one and V N < V E for intermediate
values. Maximising (17) and (18) yields optimal choices of β in the two cases, bβNand bβE,
and the achieved utility levels, bV Nand bV E, as functions of θ and y:
bβN = 1; bV N = K + log (y − θ) + log 2 if θy ≤ 12bβN ∈ (0, 1) ; bV N = K + log y if θy = 12bβN = 0; bV N = K + log y if θy ≥ 12 .
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
(19)
bβE = 1; bV E = K + log(y − θ) + log 2 if θy ≤ log 21+log 2bβE = yθ − 1log 2 ; bV E = K + log θ + yθ log 2− log log 2− 1 if log 21+log 2 ≤ θy ≤ log 2bβE = 0; bV E = K + log y if θy ≥ log 2
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
(20)
The optimal choices of “the degree of publicness” for regimes N and E are shown in Figure
2 as a function of θy , the unit cost of β as a fraction of the endowment. For suﬃciently low
costs, ( θy <
log 2
1+log 2
), all goods are chosen to be public in both N and E. For suﬃciently high
costs ( θy > log 2), all goods are private in N and E. For intermediate values, interesting
diﬀerences appear. As θy falls below log 2, E is the first to start acquiring public goods, but
for θy above 0.5 N stays completely private. At
θ
y = 0.5 N switches to completely public.
As θy continues to fall, E becomes increasingly public until
bβE = 1 at θy = log 21+log 2 .
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4. The Joint Choice of Regime and the Public-Private Mix
If obtaining the eﬃcient equilibrium were costless, then society would always be in
regime E, with the choice of β depending on θy . However, eﬃciency itself is not free. It
requires the setting up and operation of costly institutions. In what follows we relate these
costs to the choice of E versus N , taking into account the optimal choice of β in each case.
We adopt the simple assumption that there is a fixed per capita cost π of achieving
eﬃciency. bβN and bV N are still given by (19) but in regime E the maximand is now
V E = K + log (y − π − θβ) + β log 2
so that in the expressions for bβE and bV E in (20), y is now replaced by y − π, i.e.
bβE = 1; bV E = K + log(y − π − θ) + log 2 if θy−π ≤ log 21+log 2bβE = y−πθ − 1log 2 ; bV E = K + log θ + y−πθ log 2− log log 2− 1 if log 21+log 2 ≤ θy−π ≤ log 2bβE = 0; bV E = K + log(y − π) if θy−π ≥ log 2
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
Thus, conditional on society choosing E rather than N , higher values of π result in lower
values of bβE. In regime E, an increase in π is equivalent to a reduction in y, and given the
diminishing marginal utility of income embodied in the term log (y − π − θβ) the appropriate
response is to economise by choosing a lower level of publicness.
It is now straightforward to analyse the choice of regime. For any given values of π,
θ, and y, the higher of bV E and bV N indicates whether it is worth putting in place those
institutions which enable society to overcome free-rider problems and achieve eﬃciency. An
equiproportional increase in π, θ, and y has no eﬀect on bβE or bβN , or on the diﬀerencebV E − bV N , and Figure 3 shows the optimal regime, E or N , as a function of πy and θy
To interpret Figure 3, recall a result of Section 3 that in regime E (with π implicitly
equal to 0) it is optimal to choose an intermediate degree of publicness if log 2
1+log 2
< θy < log 2,
whereas in regime N βN switches from one to zero at θy = 0.5. But since V
E ≥ V N , with
equality if and only if β equals zero or one, it follows that V E > V N if log 2
1+log 2
< θy < log 2.
For positive values of πy , the range of
θ
y for which it is optimal to choose E over N becomes
narrower. If πy is high enough (greater than
1
2
− 1+log log 2
2 log 2
) then the costs of eﬃciency are too
great, whatever the cost of using the Samuelson machine to convert private to public goods.
Figure 3 thus divides (πy ,
θ
y ) space into three regions: (i) an area where it is optimal
to choose N and set βN = 1. Here either the costs of eﬃciency are so great or the costs
of publicness so low that a Nash regime can avoid any loss of welfare from free-riding by
making all goods public; (ii) an area where it is optimal to choose N and set βN = 0. In
this region either the costs of publicness are so high that both regimes would set β = 0 (so
that for π > 0 choosing E would only incur additional costs), or for θy just above 0.5 the
gain from choosing positive levels of publicness under E would not oﬀset the additional cost
of eﬃciency; (iii) an area where it is optimal to choose E, with bβE = (y−π)θ − 1log 2 .
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5. Discussion and Conclusion
Across societies there seems to be a wide variety of public-private mixes. Yet the
standard framework in public economics is one where the division of goods into public and
private is given exogenously as a technological datum. This is unsatisfactory theoretically,
and implausible as a depiction of reality, since we know that societies can and do choose to
make the consumption characteristics of some goods as public or as private as they wish.
The central question of ineﬃcient supply of the public good does not of course disappear
in the broader framework of choice of the set of public goods. Rather, the two aspects interact
in interesting ways. Figure 3 helps us to begin to understand the diﬀerent decisions that
societies make when faced with the joint choice of the degree of publicness and the degree of
eﬃciency in the supply of public goods. Not surprisingly, when the cost of turning private
goods into public goods is high, a society will go for a very low degree of publicness and when
this cost is low, it will go for a very high degree of publicness. However, both for very high
and very low costs of publicness, it is not worthwhile to pay the costs of solving collective
action problems. This is because when the degree of publicness is very low or very high, the
costs of free riding are small relative to the costs of enforcing collective action. Paradoxically,
therefore, observing free riding in the supply of public goods does not necessarily indicate
social ineﬃciency, once the costs of the “eﬃcient” outcome are taken into account. Thus a
specific hypothesis that emerges from our analysis is that we will observe a Nash equilibrium
in the supply of public goods in societies with both very high and very low degrees of
publicness.
For intermediate values of the cost of publicness, and for low enough costs of eﬃciency,
we predict that society will choose eﬃcient supply of those public goods it chooses to produce.
In this range the degree of publicness will decline with the cost of eﬃciency and the cost
of publicness. This scenario perhaps comes closest to economists’ basic intuition about
variation in the degree of publicness: as the cost of free riding increases, the value of public
goods declines, it is not worth paying the price of the marginal Samuelson machine, and the
degree of publicness falls.
Finally, consider what happens as societies become richer. If the costs of eﬃciency and
of publicness remain constant, then in Figure 3 the outcome moves along a ray towards
the origin. The most variegated pattern occurs when the ray crosses the eﬃcient region.
The prediction then is that as income increases the degree of publicness rises, but that the
likelihood of Nash equilibrium has an inverse-U shape–it is highest in both very rich and
very poor societies.
We hope that the line of enquiry begun here will prove fruitful in opening up the
black box of an assumed given set of public goods. A direct consideration of how and why
societies choose to convert some private goods into public ones, and vice versa, generates
both interesting theory, and interesting predictions and hypotheses for empirical work.
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